Thaksin’s Legacy: Thaksinomics and Its Impact on Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading by Patarapong Intarakumnerd
Thaksinomics and Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading      31 International Journal of Institutions and Economies
Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2011, pp. 31-60
Thaksin’s Legacy: Thaksinomics and Its Impact on 







Abstract: Thaksin Shinawatra was one of the most powerful prime ministers 
of Thailand. Undergirded by a set of new policies termed Thaksinomics, 
great political power, his CEO style of management, and his intention to 
make Thailand a developed country, his administration could have been a 
formidable force in transforming Thailand’s weak and fragmented innovation 
system into a stronger and more coherent one and in laying a long-lasting 
foundation for the country’s technological and industrial upgrading, as 
experienced in Japan and the East Asian NIEs. Thaksin’s administration paid 
much attention to the neglected meso and micro foundations of Thailand’s 
competiveness. For the first time, Thailand had explicit vertical industrial 
policies that were tailored to specific sectors and geographical clusters. 
These policies pushed existing central and regional government agencies 
to adjust themselves accordingly. Thaksin’s government also induced 
changes in the roles and behaviours of other actors in the country’s national 
innovation system. Nonetheless the government, to a large extent, failed to 
make an enduring impact on industrial and technology upgrading. There 
are two key factors underlying this failure: (a) deficiencies of Thaksin’s 
policies and implementation of those policies themselves and (b) resistance 
to changes by other actors in the national innovation system.
Keywords: Thaksin, Thaksinomics, national innovation system, industrial and 
technological upgrading policies, industrial cluster, Thailand 
JEL classifications: O31, O33, O38, L52
1.  Introduction 
Non-mainstream economists generally agree that there should be a more 
“historically friendly” and holistic approach than the one offered by orthodox 
neoclassical economics to analyze why some countries were successful in 
the process of industrial development and technological catching up and 32      Patarapong Intarakumnerd  
why others were not. Since the 1980s, the concept of a national innovation 
system (NIS) advanced by seminal scholars such as Christopher Freeman, 
Richard Nelson and Bengt-Ake Lundvall, has emerged as a useful analytical 
tool for this purpose. NIS is the interactive system of existing actors such as 
private and public firms (large and small), universities, government agencies 
and others, aiming at the production, diffusion and utilization of knowledge 
within national borders. Previous studies show that advanced countries 
historically have had capable actors and systemic linkages among them, 
resulting in intensive technological learning and forging ahead. By contrast, 
developing countries have had weak actors and fragmented systems leading 
to technological lag. Nonetheless, some late-industrialized countries such 
as Japan and the East Asian NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong), which themselves were developing countries in the past, effectively 
developed national innovation systems enabling technological and industrial 
upgrading. Hence, they, to a large degree, succeeded in catching up with 
forerunner countries. One of the most important ingredients in successful 
NIS is government policies that can produce a long-lasting foundation 
for building a country’s intensive technological learning capability. The 
experiences of Japan and the East Asian NIEs show that those policies 
and practices were laid down and sustained for a sufficiently long duration 
of time to produce learning processes in the national innovation system 
necessary for industrial and technological catching up. This will be further 
discussed in the article.
By comparison, the national innovation systems of less successful 
developing countries were rather weak and fragmented. Their policy formu-
lation and implementation generally failed to induce continuous intensive 
technological learning. Either the policies themselves were misplaced or 
implementation of well-thought policies was ineffective. Thailand was one 
of those countries. Nonetheless after Thaksin Shinawatra became Prime 
Minister in 2001, there was hope among many people in Thailand that his 
administration could make significant changes. It is widely accepted that 
Thaksin has been one of the most controversial and publicized political 
figures of Thailand in the past 30 years. His brand of economics, known as 
Thaksinomics, has also somewhat influenced the policymakers and media in 
Southeast Asia. Even after being pushed out from office by a military coup 
in September 2006, his legacy continues to sharply divide Thai society to 
this day. For the establishment (royalty, military, bureaucrats, the old rich 
elite, and many intellectuals), Thaksin’s regime represents a high degree of 
corruption, cronyism and gross violation of human rights, but for the poor 
and some intellectuals, Thaksin’s policies have induced necessary and major 
reform in Thailand economically and politically. For them, the dual-track 
economic policy – the main thrust of Thaksinomics – put Thailand in the right Thaksinomics and Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading      33
direction and has enhanced its international competitiveness as well as reaped 
the benefits of globalization, while empowering people at the grass roots and 
strengthening the domestic economy. 
It is the objective of the article to examine Thaksin’s legacy at length. 
The main research question is whether and to what extent Thaksin’s regime 
(policies and practices) has produced a sustainable foundation for intensive 
learning capabilities necessary for long-term industrial and technological 
upgrading of the country. The study will examine the regime’s key policies 
both in terms of content and implementation, and their impacts on key actors 
of Thailand’s innovation system, namely government policy-formulating and 
policy-implementing agencies, private companies (including transnational 
corporations, large Thai firms, SMEs and start-ups), universities and public 
research institutes, financial intermediaries, industrial associations, as well as 
institutional contexts such as trust, entrepreneurship, and so on.
The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 will present the concept 
of national innovation system (NIS) and policy framework for long-lasting 
industrial upgrading based on the experiences of Japan and the East Asian 
NIEs in building up technological and innovative capabilities. Section 3 will 
elucidate the policies and national innovation system of Thailand in the period 
before the Thaksin administration. Section 4 will examine the essence of 
Thaksinomics. Using the NIS concept and policy framework, we will evaluate 
the impacts of Thaksinomics on the long-term industrial upgrading in Thailand 
in Section 5. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in Section 6.
 
2.  National Innovation System Concept and Policy Framework for
   Industrial and Technological Upgrading
The roots of the innovation systems (IS) concepts are based on Schumpeterian 
economics, emphasizing innovation and entrepreneurship, combining the 
essence of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory and the importance of 
national institutions as propounded by Friedrich List’s national system of 
political economy. The emergence of the NIS concepts, particularly in the 
industrialized countries in the Northern hemisphere, can be traced back to the 
work of Lundvall (1985, 1988), the national system of innovation or national 
policies of innovation and other works (see Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1988). 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of national innovation system explicitly 
recognizes that technology development involves a complex interaction 
between many actors and many activities, all of which are influenced by a 
wide range of policies, incentive systems, cultural factors, and so on. Our 
analysis of the NIS in Thailand is therefore carried out by examining the 
roles, interaction and collective learning of the following main elements: 
government; university; private firms; private bridging organizations (industry, 34      Patarapong Intarakumnerd  
trade and professional organizations); financial intermediaries/markets; and 
institutional context.
Though the concept initially originated in developed countries, it has 
been recently applied to analyze the situation in developing countries – the 
latecomers to industrialization. The concept of latecomer industrialization 
was first introduced by Gerschenkron in 1962. He stresses that the crucial 
features of the latecomer countries’ development are different from those of 
the forerunner countries simply because they are late. Latecomer countries, he 
argues, are disadvantaged in their pursuit of industrial development compared 
with the forerunner countries because of a high degree of lag, especially 
in terms of institutions for development such as financial intermediaries. 
Nonetheless, they have advantages over the forerunner countries since 
they can utilize technological and institutional backlogs already created by 
forerunners, without necessarily creating those prerequisites indigenously. 
The contribution of the developing economy perspective on the NIS, 
therefore, would mainly focus on the latecomer factor in the innovation 
process.
In fact, most developed countries of today such as the United States, 
Western European countries and Japan were developing or latecomer 
countries in the past, at a time when Britain was the forerunner in terms of 
industrialization. Latecomer advantages, together with state intervention, were 
crucial factors that enabled these countries to catch up with the forerunner. 
The infant industry promotion strategy was, for example, heavily used by 
the United States during the 19th century to the extent that the eminent 
economic historian Bairoch (1993) once called it “the mother country and the 
bastion of modern protectionism”. The average tariff rates on manufactured 
products were 35-45% and 40-50% in 1820 and 1875 respectively. These 
were significantly higher than other countries at the time. In addition, 
contrary to the laissez-faire doctrine, institutions played very important 
roles in advancing technological development and innovation in the United 
States even in the 20th century. Federal and state research funds contributed 
significantly to the growth and product or process innovations in agriculture 
and related manufacturing industries such as food processing and farm 
machinery and equipment. Aircraft and electrical machinery sectors were 
major beneficiaries of military R&D. The large procurement from the military 
and space development organizations such as NASA was vital in the early 
years of new product development in the electronics sector. The emergence 
of biotechnology-based pharmaceutical industry since the 1990s was also 
importantly attributed to the close university-industry research collaboration 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993). 
Following in Gerschenkron’s footsteps, several NIS studies focusing 
on individual countries were conducted. In 1987, Freeman was the first to Thaksinomics and Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading      35
explicitly use the concept of NIS to study the economic performance of post-
war Japan. Most of the scholars engaged in this type of study concentrate 
on how institutions and systems were built and shaped to produce intensive 
learning which facilitated technological catching-up processes in newly 
industrializing economies in Asia, namely, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
(see Kim, 1993; Hou and Gee, 1993; Wong, 1995, 1999). What made these 
countries different from many less successful catching-up countries are not 
only considerable investments in physical and human capital, as suggested 
by neoclassical economists and the World Bank, but also their learning 
capabilities in identifying, adapting and operating imported technologies (Bell 
and Pavitt, 1995). 
Learning capabilities of NIEs were built and enhanced. Firms in those 
countries were active and purposeful in accumulating their capabilities in 
absorbing, understanding, mastering and upgrading technologies (Hobday, 
1995; Kim, 1997; Matthews, 2007). Equally important, institutions especially 
government policies were formulated and properly implemented to encourage 
those firms to develop their indigenous technological capabilities. Several 
scholars (see for example, Johnson, 1992; Amsden, 1989, 2001; Wade, 1990; 
Chang, 1994; Lall, 1996; Shin, 1996) have critically examined how specific 
policies in the areas of trade, investment, competition and education were 
introduced to support the process of technological capability accumulation. 
Nonetheless, the most systematic framework for analyzing technology policies 
in these countries is proposed by Lall and Teubal (1998). They contend that 
effective policy interventions have to (a) be highly context specific, that is, 
being geared to the technological endowment of each country and to the 
capabilities of its government and business sector; (b) evolve over time as 
capabilities developed; and (c) involve stakeholders in the policy process. 
According to their framework for market-stimulating technology policies, 
there are three levels or phases of policies. At the national level, the objective 
is to set national objectives and decide upon the trade-offs between them. 
At the priority-setting level, the direction of policies, and so interventions 
needed, has to be guided by a vision of future scientific, technological and 
industrial development. Policies at this level can be broadly divided into 
two types: horizontal policies aiming at stimulating generic technological 
activities and vertical policies aiming at targeting specific technologies, 
clusters and industries or regions. The latter concerns specific programmes or 
policies designed and implemented by the government to fulfil its priorities 
(see Table 1). A very interesting point illustrated by Lall and Teubal is that 
broad and generic policies are essential but not sufficient to strengthen firms’ 
technological capabilities, and subsequently countries’ competitiveness, 
policies addressing problems in specific industries, clusters and technologies 
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The national vision and strategies of Japan and the East Asian NIEs 
were somewhat different. For example, Korea relied less on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) but it pursued a sustained drive to create giant private 
conglomerates (chaebols) to internalize markets, lead heavy industry and 
create export brands. Taiwan also depended less on FDI. Instead, it heavily 
supported the creation of indigenous capability and upgrading of SMEs. The 
Taiwanese government also pushed local technology diffusion and targeted 
and orchestrated high-tech development. Singapore, on the other hand, 
relied heavily on FDI, but it aggressively targeted and screened transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and directed them into high value-added activities. 
Nonetheless, Lall and Teubal argue that these countries managed to not only 
formulate a national vision and set horizontal and vertical priorities, but also 
systematically formulate, coordinate and execute policies and supporting 
programmes to achieve their vision and priorities. Table 2 summarizes some 
successful policies used by Japan and the East Asian NIEs during their 
Table 2: Examples of Horizontal and Vertical Technology Policies in Japan and
   the NIEs during Their Catching-up Period
Horizontal Policies  Examples
Grants to support R&D in business enterprises  Singapore & Korea
Support for cooperative pre-competitive consortia  Japan & Taiwan
Promotion of technology transfer  Japan & Korea
Broad technology support for SMEs  Japan & NIEs
Vertical Policies  Examples
Subsidization and credit allocation for capital-  Japan, Korea &  
  intensive investment   Taiwan
Restriction of FDI to build local capabilities  Japan & Korea
Targeting strategic technologies for promotion in   Japan & NIEs
  national laboratories
Targeting enterprises for R&D support in particular   Japan & Korea
  technologies
Intervening in technology transfer processes to   Japan & Korea
  build specific capabilities
Guiding or subsidizing TNCs to enter targeted   Singapore
  activities or to conduct R&D
Providing subsidized credit for upgrading selected   Korea & Taiwan
  activities
Subsidizing joint R&D by enterprises and   Korea & Taiwan
  institutes in specific areas
Source: Summarized from Lall and Teubal (1998).38      Patarapong Intarakumnerd  
catching-up phase. A more detailed discussion on these measures will be 
carried out in Sections 3 and 4 where we will compare these measures with 
those adopted by Thailand.
3.  National Innovation System and Policies Concerning Industrial and
   Technological Upgrading before Thaksinomics
This section will analyze Thailand’s policies for industrial and technology 
upgrading before Thaksin came to power. It will shed light on the state of 
the country’s national innovation system by examining roles and linkages of 
important actors: government, firms, university and research and technology 
organizations, private bridging organizations, and financial intermediaries 
and markets. 
3.1  Government: Technology and Innovation Policies before the Thaksin
   Government
Before the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (January 
2001-September 2006) took office, the scope of S&T policy in Thailand was 
rather narrow. It covered only four conventional functions, namely, research 
and development, human resource development, technology transfer, and 
S&T infrastructure development. This was because S&T policy formulation 
processes were captured by scientists who subscribed to the so-called linear 
model of innovation. According to this model, private firms are “users” of 
S&T knowledge mainly produced by government agencies and universities 
(see Arnold et al., 2000). There was no articulate national innovation policy. 
Though the word “innovation” was mentioned in several national plans, it 
was not whole-heartedly incorporated into the scope of S&T policies (see 
Lauridsen, 2002). As such, the dominant orientation of policy and resource 
allocation for building industrial technology development capabilities since 
the 1960s has been on the capabilities and resources of scientific, techno-
logical and training institutions such as government agencies, universities and 
public laboratories (accounting for more than 90% of the government’s R&D 
budget) that were supposed to undertake technological activities on behalf 
of firms. Conversely, policy measures and resource allocations designed 
to strengthen the technological learning, technological capabilities and 
innovative activities of firms themselves were rather minimal and ineffective 
(Arnold et al., 2000: ix). 
In addition, unlike Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, S&T elements were not part 
of broader economic policies namely, industrial policy, investment policy and 
trade policy and, to a lesser extent, education policies (see Intarakumnerd et 
al., 2002). Industrial policy in Thailand was for decades heavily influenced by Thaksinomics and Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading      39
the World Bank’s “market-friendly” approach to industrialization. Given the 
inclination of many leading Thai technocrats – who controlled key economic 
ministries especially the powerful Ministry of Finance – towards neoclassical 
economics, policy was limited to the so-called functional or horizontal 
interventions such as promoting infrastructure, supporting general education, 
and general export promotion (World Bank, 1993). Past policies did not pay 
enough attention to the development of indigenous technological capability 
as an integral factor in the process of industrialization (Sripaipan et al., 1999: 
37). The promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) was aimed primarily 
at generating inward capital flow and employment. Unlike Singapore where 
FDI was specifically used to upgrade local technological capability (see Wong, 
1999), there was no explicit and proactive link between promoting FDI and 
upgrading local technological capability in Thailand. Trade policy, the most 
important instrument in Thailand being tariffs, was not used strategically 
to promote technological learning such as in the NIEs (see Amsden, 1989; 
Chang, 1994; Lall, 1996). Instead, trade policy was very much influenced by 
macroeconomic policy, for instance, to reduce domestic demand for imports at 
the time of balance of payment deficit. The Ministry of Finance, the dominant 
agency which controlled policy, had little knowledge or experience with 
industry and industrial restructuring (Lauridsen, 2000: 16-20). 
Moreover, industrial policy in Thailand was limited to so-called 
functional intervention such as promoting infrastructure building, general 
education, and export push in general. There were virtually no selective 
policy measures, such as special credit allocation and special tariff protection, 
targeting particular industries or clusters. The exception was the local content 
require-ment in the automobile industry, which was rather successful in 
raising the local content of passenger vehicles to 54% in 1986 (see Doner, 
1992). Interestingly, with the exception of the automotive industry, there 
was no reciprocal performance-based criteria (such as export and local value 
added and technological upgrading targets) set for providing state incentives 
such as in Korea or Japan (see Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1989, 
1998; Chang, 1994; Lall, 1996). Investment promotion privileges, for 
example, were given without setting performance conditions. The intention 
to attract foreign direct investment and promote export overshadowed the 
need to develop local initiatives and indigenous technological capabilities. 
As a result, linkages between transnational corporations and local firms 
were also weak. Unlike Taiwan, governmental protection and promotion, 
without strengthening the absorptive capabilities of Thai suppliers, also left a 
profound impact on the weak technology and suppliers’ network of industries 
(Vongpivat, 2003).
In addition, many government policies and initiatives failed to be 
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and specialization among government agencies; the generally ineffective 
involvement of private sector industrial stakeholders; the weak or non-existent 
capacities in the key ministerial agencies to formulate and implement and 
monitor and evaluate science, technology, and innovation policies; and the 
absence of a suitable supra-ministerial body to guide, facilitate and coordinate 
the development of the science, technology and innovation environment in 
Thailand (Arnold et al., 2000).
3.2  Private Firms
Several studies of Thai firms conducted since the 1980s state that most firms 
have grown without deepening their technological capabilities in the long run 
and that their technological learning has been very slow and passive (see Bell 
and Scott-Kemmis, 1985; Chantramonklasri, 1985; Thailand Development 
Research Institute, 1989; Dahlman and Brimble, 1990; Tiralap, 1990; 
Mukdapitak, 1994; Lall, 1998). The World Bank’s study (see Arnold et al., 
2000) confirms this long-standing feature of Thai firms. Only a small minority 
of large subsidiaries of transnational corporations (TNCs), large domestic 
firms and SMEs had R&D capability, while the majority struggled with 
deficient design and engineering capability. For a very large number of SMEs, 
the key concern was about building up more basic operational capabilities, 
together with craft and technician capabilities for efficient acquisition, 
assimilation and incremental upgrading of fairly standard technology. The 
slow technological capability development of Thai firms stands in contrast 
to Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese firms. Firms in these countries moved 
rather rapidly from being mere imitators to innovators. As early as the 1960s, 
Japanese firms became more innovative, invested heavily in R&D and relied 
less on the importation of foreign technologies (Odagiri and Goto, 1993). In 
general, firms in Korea and Taiwan, where industrialization (beginning with 
import substitution) started more or less in the same period as in Thailand, 
were more successful in increasing absorptive capacity (of foreign technology) 
and deepening indigenous technological capabilities in several industries (see 
for example, Amsden, 1989; Kim, 1993, 1997; Lall, 1996; Hobday, 1995). 
In the electronics industry, for instance, Korean and Taiwanese latecomer 
firms were able to climb the technological ladder (from simple assembly to 
own design and R&D) by exploiting institutional mechanisms and acting 
as manufacturing and designing subcontractors of TNCs in the West which 
helped them acquire advanced technology and access demanding foreign 
markets (see Hobday, 1995).
Thailand and Korea Innovation Surveys both conducted in 2002 
(Brooker Group, 2003 and STEPI, 2002) illustrate the differences in terms 
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far behind companies in Korea with respect to innovation. More than 40% 
of Korean firms carried out innovations against just above 10% in Thailand. 
It is striking that a much higher share of companies in Korea carried out 
product innovations. This could be an indication that Thai companies were 
at the stage where they preferred to use their resources to improve the 
production process rather than the product itself, which in turn could hint at 
a subcontracting-based economy. At the same time very few companies in 
Thailand were engaged in both product and process innovation, which was 
very common in Korea. This reflects the more advanced innovative behaviour 
of Korean companies.
Moreover, the horizontal relationship between firms in the same or related 
industries is viewed as rather unimportant by the surveyed firms. Co-operative 
consortiums among firms, such as those found in Japan or Taiwan, to research 
particular technology or products are very rare in Thailand. Moreover, as the 
intra-firm technological capabilities themselves are weak, the innovation-
centre interaction generated from such links is, therefore, limited.
3.3  Universities and Government Research Technology Organizations
In terms of R&D, the contribution of universities to gross expenditure on 
R&D (GERD) is around 31% against 44% from the private sector, 22% 
from government, and 3% from non-profit organizations in 2003. A survey 
of R&D outputs of specialized R&D units in universities and public research 
institutes between 2002 and 2004 was conducted by the National Science 
and Technology Development Agency. It shows that R&D outputs have been 
increasing year by year. Nonetheless, in terms of contribution to technological 
progress of firms, the role of universities in Thailand was quite limited. From 
the Thailand R&D/Innovation Survey 2002 and Korean Innovation Survey 
2002 (Brooker Group, 2003 and STEPI, 2002), it can be seen that universities 
and research institutes were regarded as considerably more important sources 
of information by Korean firms than by Thai firms. In general university-
industry linkages in Thailand were weak. Thai firms did not regard university 
and public research institutes as important sources of information and 
knowledge. They did not collaborate closely with local universities and 
public research institutes. They also regarded technical support from local 
universities and public research institutes as being relatively weak. Thus, 
most university-industry collaborative projects were limited to consulting and 
technical services. More advanced projects were far from plentiful. Inter-firm 
relationships with customers, suppliers and parents/associated companies 
were much more important both in terms of sources of knowledge and actual 
collaboration in innovation projects (Schiller, 2006). The irrelevancy of Thai 42      Patarapong Intarakumnerd  
universities to industry is quite different from the Japanese case, for example. 
In the early period after WWII, Japanese universities acted as gatekeepers 
introducing, assimilating and implementing advanced imported technologies 
(Goto, 2000: 107).
Similarly, technological activities of public research technology organiza-
tions (RTOs) mainly focused on R&D and providing technical services such 
as testing and calibrating, not particularly on assisting firms to build up their 
internal technological capabilities especially non-R&D capability such as 
technology assimilation, adaptation, designing and engineering, which were 
the technological thresholds typically faced by most Thai firms. In this aspect, 
Thai RTOs behaved differently from their Korean and Taiwanese counterparts 
in the 1970s and 1980s, a period during which the three countries were more 
or less at the same level of development. The Korean Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) and Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute 
(ITRI), for example, emphasized institutional and technical support for 
industrial technological capability development within firms, such as helping 
them to solve their operational problems (see Hobday, 1995). Taiwan was 
very successful in using RTOs to facilitate technology diffusion to support 
indigenous firms, mostly small and medium enterprises (SMEs). ITRI, in 
particular, has been widely credited with helping to create and advance 
the semiconductor industry in Taiwan through a well-planned strategy of 
assimilating foreign technology and transferring them to local enterprises 
through spin-offs. The success of this strategy depended on careful long-term 
planning, vision at the top, and existence of abundant high-quality engineers 
(Wong, 1999). 
3.4  Private Bridging Organizations 
This section analyzes the roles and capabilities of non-profit organizations 
such as trade and industrial associations in supporting technological capability 
development and innovation activities of firms. Where innovation support 
was concerned, there were only a small number of these organizations 
disseminating knowledge and promoting the innovation capability of firms. 
In Thailand, the Federation of Thai Industry (FTI) and Thai Chamber of 
Commerce (TCC) have been the most powerful private-sector organizations. 
They exert a strong influence on the government’s economic policies. They 
can pressure government to induce policy changes. Most of their activities, 
however, aim at the protection of their short-term interests and gaining 
leverage in negotiations with government (Laothamatas, 1992; Phongpaichit 
and Baker, 1997a: 150), such as export quotas, import levies, and tax regime. 
Before the Thaksin government, FTI and TCC were not very active in 
promoting the innovation capability of Thai firms. History does matter as well. Thaksinomics and Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading      43
Their members came from commercial capital rather than industrial capital 
(Samudavanija, 1990: 275). Therefore, they paid more attention to short-term 
commercial gains rather than long-term capability development.
FTI and TCC voiced their needs and concerns in the Joint Public-
Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC), in an attempt to avail themselves 
of investment privileges and commercial advantages (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 1997b). The roles of this committee were very prominent in the mid-
1980s when the idea of “Thailand Inc.”, aspired by the government during 
that period, was popular. Since then, both FTI and TCC have represented 
the interests of the private sector in several national-level committees. The 
importance of the JPPCC, nonetheless, has substantially declined.
With regard to trust building among members, which is a kind of social 
infrastructure from which knowledge diffusion and innovation emanate, FTI 
and TCC have not played a significant role. They could create a certain level 
of trust among members by congregation, exchanges of ideas and opinions and 
sharing information among members. In general, trust gradually emerged from 
joint activities such as marketing campaigns and trade fairs. However, the 
internal organizations of FTI and TCC were politically divided. For example, 
since TCC proliferated with a growing number of provincial members, the 
organization has been more divided and fragmented because of regional power 
politics (Phuchatkan, 1992). The provincial chambers alleged that Bangkok-
based business groups manipulated TCC (Chotiya, 1997: 258-259).
3.5  Financial Intermediaries
Several industrial development banks were set up to provide long- and 
medium-term finance. The four most important ones were the Industrial 
Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT), SME Bank, Small Industry Credit 
Guarantee Corporation (SICGC), and Innovation Development Fund (IDF). 
Some of these financial institutions were not well known to private firms 
and they did not operate efficiently because of chronic bureaucratic red tape. 
While the maximum loan limit under the programmes was rather low, the 
interest rates imposed were not so different from those charged by commercial 
banks. The application procedures were complicated and time-consuming. 
This discouraged firms, especially SMEs, from seeking institutional loans 
and forced them to take loans from informal sources where they could obtain 
credits more quickly.
Regarding the capital market, there was no stock market especially 
established to promote such high-tech start-ups like those in Japan (JASDAG, 
NASDAQ-Japan, and MOTHERS), Korea (KOSDAQ), and Taiwan (TAIDAQ 
and TIGER). The Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) was a business 
unit of the main market, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). It was 44      Patarapong Intarakumnerd  
set up in 1999 as a new secondary market for trading SME shares. MAI’s 
requirements for initial public offering have been adjusted to allow SMEs 
flexibility in entering the capital markets. However, this market was not 
specifically aimed at promoting knowledge-intensive start-ups. Moreover, in 
the opinion of many SMEs, the MAI requirements tend to disqualify most 
small and medium-sized enterprises because they fall below the minimum 
capitalization level. As a result, there are too few outstanding shares to trade 
adequately on the market (Freeman, 2000).
In 1994, the Thai Venture Capital Association (TVCA) was set up in view 
of the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals to provide firms access to 
finance. Compared with Taiwan, Thailand’s venture capital was lagging both 
in terms of growth of the venture capital industry itself and the impacts on 
financing innovation and emergence of knowledge-intensive start-ups. Venture 
capital investment in Thailand tended to finance firms at an expansion or 
mezzanine stage, not in the early start-up phase like in Taiwan (see Taiwan 
Venture Capital Association, 2003).
To summarize, Thailand’s national innovation system before the Thaksin 
era was weak and fragmented. Private firms were passive and slow in 
technological learning. Government policies were limited to market-friendly 
intervention, and their implementation was ineffective and incoherent. 
Education institutes were fairly isolated from industry. Financing mechanisms 
for innovation were inadequate. Trade/industry associations were incompetent 
and politicized. The institutional context was unsupportive in stimulating 
innovation. The situation had been perpetuated for the past 50 years after 
Thailand seriously embarked on industrialization.
4.  Ideas behind and Main Thrusts of Thaksinomics
The media and academics in Thailand and Southeast Asia labelled Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s distinctive economic policy as Thaksinomics, which literally 
means the economics of Thaksin. Thaksin himself gave the credit to President 
Arroyo of the Philippines, who possesses a doctorate degree in economics, 
as the first person to coin the term Thaksinomics (Phongpaichit and Baker, 
2004). Using different perspectives, several academics have attempted to 
analyze the essence and ideas behind Thaksinomics. Academics such as 
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) have reviewed Thaksin’s speeches and 
found that his ideas seem to constitute a series of bullet points held together 
by a certain thematic thread, but which are essentially incoherent. There 
are clear influences of management textbooks including a range of buzz 
phrases. Likewise, Rangsan Thanapornpun (2004), a leading Thai economist, 
argues that Thaksinomics cannot be considered a new school of thought in 
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economic behaviours, phenomena or theoretical problems. Nonetheless, it 
offers a set of policies. Dual-track policy is the main thrust of this new policy 
menu. The Thai government tried to enhance international competitiveness 
of the nation by strengthening the “external” side of the Thai economy, 
namely, export, foreign direct investment and tourism. At the same time, it 
attempted to increase the capabilities of domestic and grass-root economies 
by implementing projects such as the Village Fund (1 million baht to increase 
local capabilities of each village), a three-year debt moratorium on farmers’ 
debts, One-Village-One-Product Project (supporting each village’s champion 
product), and the People’s Bank (giving loans to underprivileged people with 
no requirement of collateral). Thanapornpun also considers Thaksinomics 
as a “political brand name” invented by Thaksin’s supporters to help him 
gain popularity and become a charismatic leader of Southeast Asia. The 
aforementioned new grass-roots-supporting policies, in particular, are populist 
policies aiming at winning votes from the rural poor. This belief was shared 
by several academics and politicians from opposition parties.
Albeit inconsistent and evolving, Thaksinomics represents a sharp shift 
away from the neoliberal model towards the developmentalist view that 
government should play a more active role to protect and promote firms and 
sectors in its catching-up efforts to overcome the disadvantages of competing 
against more advanced economies (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004). It is in line 
with the notion on the roles of government in a latecomer context stressed 
by Gerschenkron and practised by Japan and NIEs as already described in 
Section 2. 
The Thaksin government publicly announced the national goal of 
eradicating poverty within eight years or two terms in the office and 
taking Thailand to a developed country status. Unlike its predecessors that 
paid most attention to macroeconomic stability, the government focused 
more on enhancing meso- and micro-level foundations for international 
competitiveness. The high priority of the competitiveness issue on the 
government’s agenda was illustrated by the establishment of the National 
Competitiveness Committee chaired by the prime minister. Importantly, it 
was the first time that the Thai government had formulated serious selective 
policies addressing specific sectors and clusters. The government identified 
five strategic sectors on which Thailand should concentrate its efforts: 
automotive, food, tourism, fashion, and software. Clear goals were assigned to 
these five clusters: Kitchen of the World (food), Detroit of Asia (automotive), 
Tropical Fashion of Asia, World Graphic Design and Animation Centre 
(software), and Tourism Capital of Asia. Building innovative capabilities of 
the Thai nation was highly regarded as a very important factor in increasing 
and sustaining its international competitiveness. “Innovative nation with 
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by the government. To make this dream come true, several strategies were 
devised. These included continuous investment in R&D and technology, 
conducive environment for attracting and stimulating innovation, high 
accessibility to knowledge and information across the nation, fluent English 
as a second language, cultivating a strong learning basis such as passion for 
reading and better accessibility to cheap but good books (see Phasukavanich, 
2003). Equally important, the Ten-Year Science and Technology Action 
Plan (2004-2013), approved by the Thaksin Cabinet, projects an ambitious 
vision that the Thai knowledge-based society will be able to compete 
internationally. It particularly placed the concept of a national innovation 
system and industrial clusters at the core. The scope of the plan was much 
broader than the aforementioned four functional areas of S&T policy (research 
and development, human resource development, technology transfer, and 
S&T infrastructure development). Measures to stimulate innovations and to 
strengthen the national innovation system and industrial clusters are explicitly 
highlighted.
The stark difference between the Thaksin government and its predecessors 
is that Thaksin himself and key persons around him responsible for economic 
development were not conventional economists. They subscribed to the tenets 
of management science, especially that of the American business school. For 
instance, they view a country like a company where the prime minister is its 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO). To work more effectively like a company, 
reform of the government bureaucracy was carried out. The introduction of 
the CEO management style aimed to integrate related government policies 
under clear leadership at the levels of department, ministry, and cabinet. Also, 
a performance-based management (PBM) system which clearly delineates 
contractual relationships and delegation of authority in the bureaucratic lines 
of governance was put in place.
Another famous management concept vigorously promoted by the 
Thaksin government was the cluster concept. Studies of clusters have a long 
history. Alfred Marshall’s contribution in 1890 in his famous “Principles 
of Economics” was a starting point – although he used the term “industrial 
districts”. Marshall theorized and emphasized the dynamics of external 
economies associated with learning, innovation and increased specialization. 
Nonetheless, it was the management guru Michael Porter who popularized 
the concept of clusters. According to Porter (1998), industrial clusters 
are geographical concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized 
suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions (for example, universities, standard-setting agencies, and trade 
associations) that combine to create new products and/or services in specific 
lines of business. Clusters emerge and develop because geographical 
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generates positive externalities for participating actors. These benefits attract 
similar and related firms and other actors because they also want to take part 
in the interactive learning that takes place. 
During the rule of the Thaksin government, Porter and his team were 
commissioned to study two clusters as examples for development of the 
concept: one involved shrimps while the other concerned tourism on Phuket 
Island. The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) were 
subsequently, responsible for the overall cluster policy of the country. It made 
significant attempts to diffuse the concept to various government and private-
sector agencies by organizing seminars and workshops in the main regions of 
Thailand. It commissioned another study to undertake a cluster mapping of 
Thailand, namely, identifying significant agglomerations of firms that function 
or have the potential to function as clusters in various geographical locations 
throughout the country. As a result, several implementing government 
agencies such as the Department of Industrial Promotion and sectoral-specific 
institutes under the Ministry of Industry (Thai Automotive Institute, Thailand 
Textile Institute, National Food Institute, Electrical and Electronics Institute 
and so forth), National Science and Technology Development Agency under 
the Ministry of Science and Technology, Office of SMEs Promotion and 
others tried to develop their own cluster projects in their responsible areas 
(Intellectual Property Institute, 2003).
The Board of Investment (BOI) under the chairmanship of Dr. Somkid 
Jatusripitak, Deputy Prime Minister and Thaksin’s economic tsar, substantially 
changed its policy by paying more attention to issues underlying long-
term competitiveness of the country, namely, development of indigenous 
technological capability and human resources. A special investment package 
promoting skills, technology and innovation (STI) was initiated. Firms are 
eligible for one or two years of extra tax incentives if they undertake the 
following activities in the first three years: spending at least 1%-2% of their 
sales on R&D or design; ensuring that at least 5% of their workforce comprise 
scientists or engineers with at least a Bachelor’s degree; spending at least 
1% of their total payroll on employee training; and spending at least 1% of 
total payroll on training the personnel of their local suppliers. The flourishing 
of cluster concept also affected investment policy. In 2004, BOI initiated 
another set of investment packages for specific strategic clusters such as hard 
disk drives and semiconductors. Eligible firms in these sectors were not only 
final product makers but also suppliers in the value chain. This indicates a 
major shift in the focus of investment policy measures from giving incentives 
for individual projects, which might not be related to each other, to using 
incentives to strengthen clusters as a whole.
The cluster concept was used as the main industrial policy of the Thaksin 
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used to strengthen advanced industries both in services and manufacturing 
such as the automotive, textile and garment, software and tourism industries 
in order to create coherent and innovative industrial clusters. At the regional 
level, Thailand was divided into 19 geographical areas. Each area had to plan 
and implement its own cluster strategy focusing on a few strategic products 
or services. It was supervised by the so-called “CEO Governors” who were 
authorized by the central government to act like provincial Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs). At the local level, the cluster concept was applied to increase 
the capacity of the grass-roots economy in the name of “community-based 
clusters”, especially to help the One-Village-One-Product Project succeed.
In a nutshell, the cluster concept was introduced to address coordination 
failures and to stimulate knowledge flow and linkages among actors in 
the innovation system, which were the major problems before the Thaksin 
government came to power as illustrated in Section 3. It aimed to strengthen 
inter-firm collaboration (between producers, customers and suppliers) and 
the relationships between firms and universities/public research institutes at 
sectoral, regional and local levels.
Together with these cluster initiatives, the Thaksin government tried to 
build S&T infrastructure in provinces outside Bangkok by initiating a plan 
to set up regional science parks and incubators in the north, northeast, east 
and south. These regional science parks and incubators were established on 
university campuses to act as intermediaries between local universities and 
local entrepreneurs and promoters of new knowledge-intensive companies. 
Furthermore, at the level of individuals and firms, the Thaksin government 
attempted to make Thais more entrepreneurial. It encouraged them to change 
their attitude from being employees of government or big corporations to 
self-made entrepreneurs. The Ministry of Industry resolved to produce 5,000 
new entrepreneurs per year. As a result, financial incentives, technical support 
and training courses were provided by government agencies and education 
institutes to individuals who wanted to be entrepreneurs and to start new 
businesses. Table 3 summarizes the main thrusts of the Thaksin government’s 
policy based on Lall and Teubal’s (1998) framework for analysis.
5.  Impacts of Thaksinomics on Thailand’s Long-term Industrial
   Upgrading and National Innovation System
As mentioned earlier, the Thaksin government has made significant changes 
in policy paradigms in the government sector. For the first time, Thailand 
had targeted goals and policies for specific sectors and clusters. Government 
policy measures became more sector- and/or cluster-specific. For instance, 
industrial consultancy services operated by NSTDA under the Industrial 
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technology-intensive firms, not labour-intensive ones. During the rule of the 
Thaksin government, the programme was restructured and strengthened to be 
more sector-specific, along the lines of the government’s sectoral initiatives. 
The main differences in science, technology and innovation before and during 
the Thaksin era are summarized in Table 4.
Moreover Thaksinomics impacted on other actors interacting with the 
government. The roles of the business associations, for example, were af-
fected. The Thaksin government thought that Joint Public-Private Consultative 
Committee (JPPCC) was rather passive and, finally, changed the style of its 
operation from large assemblies that took place sporadically to less formal 
meetings every Friday. This new form of informal meetings between the 
Prime Minister and the private sector led to clearer national strategic goals 
guided by more up-to-date concepts such as supply chain management and 
industrial clustering. The private-sector organizations began to acknowledge 
the importance of clusters and tried to use the cluster concept to formulate and 
implement their strategies. The Thai Chamber of Commerce and Federation of 
Table 4:  Main Differences in Science, Technology and Innovation Policies
   before and during the Thaksin Era
Policy Paradigm/Instruments   Before Thaksin Era  During Thaksin Era
Type of intervention   Market friendly/  Vertical (sector and
  horizontal   cluster specific)
Level of intervention  Mainly macro  Macro/meso/micro
Alignment of economic and   Fairly separated   Better alignment
STI policies 
Mental model of STI policies  Linear model of   More systemic
  innovation  approach
Key STI policy instruments  • R&D budget for   • Geographical cluster
    university/research    initiative
    institutes  • Sectoral-specific
   • R&D tax incentives    government supports
  • Building up S&T   • Government-owned
    manpower     venture capital
  • S&T infrastructure  • New entrepreneur-
  • Linear technology     ship development
    transfer mechanism    programme 
      • Regional incubators/
        science parks
 Source: Author.Thaksinomics and Thailand’s National Innovation System and Industrial Upgrading      51
Thai Industries started to carry out their activities cluster-wise and reorganize 
their internal organizations according to clusters (Intellectual Property 
Institute, 2003). 
Similarly, public RTOs and universities were also under pressure from the 
Thaksin government and the Budget Bureau to increase their revenue, hence 
reducing their reliance on the national budget. They were forced to become 
more relevant to industrial needs in order to earn extra income. In the past 
few years, some Thai public universities attained autonomous status. The idea 
was to take them out of the bureaucratic system and allow them more financial 
freedom. Most of their budget is still subsidized by the government but they 
are expected to generate relatively more income from other sources, especially 
from the private sector. Therefore, they have to conduct research and other 
activities, which are more relevant to industry. Recently, universities have 
made inroads into obtaining more industry sponsorships and to forge links 
with industry through establishing collaborative R&D, training activities, and 
linkage mechanisms, namely, technology and business incubators, technology 
transfer departments, technology licensing offices (to license out intellectual 
property acquired as a result of their research) and science parks (see College 
of Management, 2003; Schiller, 2006).
The advent of the Thaksin government and its interaction with other 
actors of the NIS had, to a certain extent, inspired systemic learning, that is, 
changes in behaviours of those actors. It also set up well-defined national 
goals, articulated clear visions and formulated horizontal (activities) and 
vertical (sectors and clusters) priorities, namely, Levels 1 and 2 of Lall and 
Teubal’s policy framework. Some policies responding to such priorities 
were initiated, as mentioned earlier. Nonetheless, the implementation and 
coordination of such policies (Level 3 of the framework) were far from 
successful for the country’s long-run industrial upgrading. The Thaksin 
government largely failed to ensure consistency and continuity of those 
policies and to set up mechanisms to enforce, monitor and evaluate the 
outcomes of those policies (see Table 3). On the one hand, the strong 
centralization of power and the CEO style of management gave Thaksin’s 
government the opportunity to push harder for the implementation of policies 
for industrial upgrading. On the other hand, the discretionary power of the 
government and, especially Thaksin himself, led to policies being captured 
by particularistic interests, policy unpredictability, ad-hoc decision making 
in favouring politicians’ pet projects, and policy rhetoric rather than concrete 
results (Lauridsen, 2008).
The failure of the Thaksin government is also partly attributed to the 
fact that in spite of the introduction of a new paradigm in favour of a system 
of innovation at the top level of the policymaking process (i.e. Thaksin, key 
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to a large extent, locked in the old paradigm. Many senior policymakers in 
STI policies, for instance, were still the same old group of scientists or their 
successors who strongly believed in the linear model of innovation. They 
might have familiarized themselves with the new concept and started to use 
new terms such as innovation systems, clusters, innovation networks, linkages 
and so forth. Nonetheless, during STI policymaking, they still put emphasis 
on research and development within public research institutes and universities 
and exploited existing research capabilities and outputs to solve the problems 
of private firms, which were still mainly regarded as “users” of knowledge 
and technologies (Intarakumnerd, 2006a).
In practice, policy measures to enhance technological and innovative 
capabilities of firms and to solve systemic failures such as creating 
intermediaries, linkages, and institutional context (for instance, conducive 
intellectual property regime, trust, entrepreneurship) were given much less 
priority and fewer resources. For example, the total R&D expenditure by 
the public sector (including government agencies, public research institutes 
and universities) was around US$262 million in 2005 (NSTDA, 2006). 
On one project, approximately US$22 million per year was spent to build 
seven centres of excellence mostly for providing S&T manpower at the 
postgraduate level (Office of Higher Education Commission, 2006). By 
contrast, public subsidy for the payment of private firms’ consultancy fees in 
the ITAP programme – one of the most outstanding programmes to enhance 
technological capabilities of private firms and to mitigate systemic failures 
– was less than US$1 million per year (Suprattaraprateep, 2007). At the same 
time, for many government officials in economic ministries, the neoclassical 
economic paradigm primarily continues to direct the rationale for government 
intervention. Initiatives to solve systemic failures, such as providing needed 
grants or direct subsidies as extended in the East Asian NIEs to help private 
firms increase their technological capabilities, were opposed on the grounds 
of market distortion (and inducing corruption).
Cluster policy, one of the spectacular key policies initiated during the 
Thaksin era, is a good example. In reality, there were several shortcomings 
in its implementation:
•   Confusion of the cluster concept itself. Different government and private-
sector agencies had different understandings of the cluster concept. Some 
considered a cluster as an industrial sector with no specific geographical 
concentration in mind. For them, a sector covering the whole country 
was a cluster. As a result, each agency implemented a cluster strategy 
according to its understanding.
•   Fragmented implementation. Cross-ministerial policy coordination has 
been a major problem in Thailand. Although the cluster policy was 
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Social Development Board oversaw the supposedly integrated national 
cluster strategy, the implementation was still incoherent.
•   Lack of champions and trust in the private sector. Firms in the same 
cluster usually see others as competitors; it is quite difficult for them 
to collaborate. The overseas-Chinese Thais, the dominant group of 
entrepreneurs in the country, collaborate more with firms in the same 
family clans than with outsiders (see Intarakumnerd, 2006b).
•   Limited support from the local governments. Unlike other countries, local 
governments in Thailand have a short development history. Until recently, 
the local government had very limited roles and budget. In the course of 
time, even though their roles and budgetary authority expanded, local 
government administrators neither have an understanding of nor do they 
pay attention to the cluster concept.
•   Limited linkages between private firms and university and public research 
institutes as knowledge providers. The relationship between firms and 
university and public research institutes in Thailand is relatively weak. 
It is based on private relationships rather than organizational ones. Most 
of them were ad hoc and concentrated on training and consultancy 
rather than long-term collaborative R&D. Therefore, universities and 
government research organizations are not usually agents in clusters. 
The knowledge flows from them which could help to revitalize firms in 
clusters are quite limited.
The policies of the Thaksin regime also had negative impacts on the 
innovation system. The major impact is pervasive corruption. It not only 
increased the scale of old types of corruption like bribery, but also induced 
new ones such as “policy corruption” (implementing government policies that 
are beneficial to the ruling party’s financiers), corruption involving conflicts 
of interest (such as concluding trade agreements that benefit businesses 
owned by core party leaders or their relatives), “access corruption” (unequal 
access to government data and state mechanisms which are used to benefit 
politicians’ cronies), and so forth (Boonmi, 2006). Many people, especially 
the middle class, not only believed in the allegations of corruption but they 
were also appalled by the allegations. This adversely affected trust among 
actors in the NIS, as they doubted the real intention of Thaksin’s policies and 
were less willing to collaborate. This is one factor responsible for the failures 
that arose after the implementation of well-intentioned policies. For example, 
the 1.8-billion-bhat Bangkok Fashion City project, a huge project under 
the targeted fashion sector, aimed at transforming Bangkok into a regional 
fashion hub at a par with Paris and Milan by focusing on raising international 
awareness of Thai design and skills. Although a few local manufacturers 
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criticized for lacking transparency, for benefiting a few entrepreneurs and 
for wasting too much money on luxurious trips and exhibitions. Many 
manufacturers were either reluctant to join or were cut off from the project. 
By mid-2005, only seven out of eleven projects under the campaign had 
started (Lauridsen, 2008). At the end, the military and other establishment 
forces whose economic and political interests had been hurt by the Thaksin 
administration’s policies used corruption charges and other alleged acts of 
mismanagement and abuse as a pretext to oust the Thaksin government by 
staging a coup in September 2006.
6.  Conclusion
Thaksin Shinawatra was one of the most powerful prime ministers of 
Thailand. Unprecedentedly, he completed a full term and, subsequently, 
in the second election, was voted back to the office to head a single-party 
government. Altogether he was prime minister for almost six years. With 
such great political power, his CEO style of management, and his intention 
to make Thailand a developed country, his administration could have been a 
formidable force in transforming Thailand’s weak and fragmented innovation 
system into a stronger and more coherent one, and it could have laid a long-
lasting foundation for the country’s technological and industrial upgrading, as 
experienced in Japan and the East Asian NIEs.
Passive and slow technological learning of firms, ineffective and in-
coherent government policies, isolated education and training institutes, tech-
nologically unsupportive and risk-averse financial institutions, incompetent 
and politicized trade/industry associations and an unfavourable institutional 
context had been perpetuating circumstances for the past 50 years of 
Thailand’s industrialization before Thaksin came to power. Unlike previous 
governments, his administration paid considerably more attention to the meso 
and micro foundations of the country’s competiveness. For the first time, 
Thailand had explicit vertical industrial policies that were tailored to specific 
sectors and geographical clusters. These policies pushed existing central and 
regional government agencies to adjust themselves accordingly. Some policy 
measures which were especially important for industrial upgrading at the firm 
level, for example, the Industrial Technology Assistance Programme (ITAP), 
have been restructured to be more specific in serving government targeted 
sectors. The Thaksin government also induced changes in the roles and 
behaviours of other actors in the Thai NIS. It pressured universities to conduct 
more research and become more relevant to industry. It initiated policies that 
encouraged Thai firms to move faster in developing their own technological 
and innovative capabilities. It worked closer with private-sector linkage 
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Nonetheless, unlike Japan and the East Asian NIEs, the Thaksin govern-
ment, to a large extent, failed to set in motion an effective and long-lasting 
learning process in the country’s national innovation system and its pursuit 
of successful industrial and technological catching up. There are two key 
factors underlying this failure: (a) the deficiencies of Thaksin’s policies and 
implementation of those policies themselves and (b) the resistance to changes 
by other actors in the national innovation system. The Thaksin government 
largely failed to ensure consistency and continuity of those policies and to set 
up mechanisms and institutions to enforce, coordinate, monitor and evaluate 
the outcomes of those policies. Thaksin and his key ministers and close 
aides were preoccupied with grand visions and the big picture and neglected 
to pay sufficient attention to issues engendered in institutionalization and 
sustainability of those policies. As a result, several policies were short-lived 
and only served rhetorical purposes. In addition, the long-term industrial 
upgrading policies were largely compromised by the idiosyncratic nature 
of the policymaking process during the Thaksin era which was largely 
based on the discretionary power of the government and, especially Thaksin 
himself. This led to policies being captured by particularistic interests, policy 
unpredictability, and ad-hoc decision making in favouring unsound pet 
projects. One key lesson learnt from the Thaksin era is that, despite sound 
policies, the importance of stakeholder engagement and support in policy 
and programme formulation to ensure subsequent smooth implementation 
cannot be under-estimated. The significance of administrative capacity to 
ensure effective translation of policies and programmes – for example, clear 
understanding of concepts – cannot be ignored. Good policies need capable 
administration to implement them. Policy formulation has to go hand in hand 
with capacity building of implementing administration.
The deficiencies of the Thaksin administration alone cannot explain the 
inability to formulate and implement sustained industrial and technological 
upgrading policies. There were at least two groups of people who were so 
influential in the process of making and implementing policies concerning 
industrial and technological upgrading long before and even during the 
Thaksin administration, as explained in Section 3.1: (1) the neoclassical 
economists-cum-bureaucrats in key economic ministries, who strongly 
opposed state intervention (especially selective and vertical industrial 
upgrading policies) and (2) the scientists-cum-policymakers in charge 
of formulating science and technology policies, most of whom strongly 
believed in the linear model of innovation and paid a lot of attention to 
science-push policies which emphasized R&D and S&T human resource 
development. The opposition posed by these two groups – direct or subtle 
– led to the failure to transform official policies into practice and perpetuated 
the old paradigms.56      Patarapong Intarakumnerd  
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